November 14, 2025 Russia’s Grey-Zone Attacks Make Risk a Moving Target

U.S. companies with European operations face growing exposure to hybrid threats that test continuity, cybersecurity, and supply networks.

By Richard Gardiner

While geopolitical instability has been a continuing concern for global manufacturers, Russia’s use of grey-zone tactics – including cyberattacks, sabotage of communications systems, infrastructure probing, GPS and air traffic interference, and disinformation – makes that risk a moving target by blurring the boundary between peace and conflict. These disruptions are persistent, uneven, and difficult to attribute, yet they can halt logistics, compromise data, and fracture supply lines. For companies with facilities, suppliers, or transport links across Europe, resilience now depends on the ability to anticipate and absorb shocks whose appearance on traditional risk maps is more difficult to predict.

Weighing the Risks of Operating in Regions Vulnerable to Hybrid Attacks

Determining how to operate or source in regions exposed to hybrid threats requires more than multidisciplinary geopolitical assessments. Companies must evaluate local resilience frameworks, foreign policy alignments, and the security of shared infrastructure. Each factor shapes both exposure and the options available to manage it.

In many respects, the uncertainty surrounding Russian grey‑zone tactics – given their complex and ambiguous nature – means there is no fixed framework for companies to follow when evaluating the risks of sourcing or locating operations in regions exposed to hybrid attacks. However, several recurring factors shape how these risks can be approached across Europe.

One important factor is the geopolitical and security context of the jurisdictions where operations are located. The threat environment is not uniform; it reflects each state’s foreign policy posture and its level of friction with Moscow. A company operating across both Poland and Hungary, for instance, would encounter different exposures. Poland, one of Ukraine’s most vocal advocates and a consistent critic of Russia, has faced regular hybrid activity aimed at political or economic disruption. Hungary, by contrast, maintains relatively cooperative ties with the Kremlin and has experienced fewer such incidents.

Countries taking assertively pro‑Ukraine positions, particularly in northern and eastern Europe, have tended to record a higher frequency of hybrid operations, including drone incursions, airspace violations, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and infrastructure probing. Yet these same countries are typically home to robust resilience frameworks designed to mitigate the operational fallout of such events. Finland, for example, has embedded risk management into its national Comprehensive Security Strategy, which formalizes coordination between the public and private sectors in protecting vital functions. Under this model, joint contingency planning, cross‑sector information exchange, and strategic stockpiling have become part of routine civil preparedness.

Within this landscape, the nature of disruption is rarely uniform. A drone incursion, for example, generates a different operational impact from a targeted cyber or arson attack on a logistics hub. Exposure also varies by sector. Firms involved in defense‑related manufacturing or supply chains supporting Ukraine are more likely to attract attention from Russian‑aligned actors. Conversely, those operating in civilian consumer sectors often face indirect risks stemming from infrastructure dependencies rather than direct targeting.

Understanding exposure increasingly involves identifying specific dependencies, such as reliance on vulnerable energy corridors, telecommunications systems, or logistical chokepoints, where interruptions could trigger cascading financial or reputational effects. In hybrid‑prone environments, therefore, risk is shaped less by proximity to conflict zones and more by the degree of integration into vulnerable systems and the foreign policy stance of the country in question.

Accounting for a Geopolitical “Risk Premium” in Nearshoring and Site Selection

The costs of resilience are no longer incidental. As companies shift production closer to key markets, they must also budget for hybrid-threat exposure through supplier diversification, cybersecurity readiness, and more complex insurance arrangements. These measures define a new kind of operating premium that accompanies strategic relocation.

In response to the growing hybrid threat, companies are likely to face incremental costs linked to resilience measures. These typically include investment in cybersecurity – both through the continuous training of personnel and the hardening of digital systems, as well as the development of parallel or distributed supply chains designed to limit exposure to any single region or corridor. Many firms have also begun exploring redundancy models not unlike digital twins, maintaining backup nodes or logistics hubs in countries perceived to face lower risks of grey‑zone interference.

Insurance is another emerging variable in this risk premium. The ambiguous nature of hybrid activity complicates how incidents are interpreted under insurance frameworks, particularly for war, terrorism, and political violence (WTPV) coverage. As most policies rely on precise legal definitions to attribute liability, hybrid events often fall into interpretive gaps, creating uncertainty for both insurers and insureds.

Beyond direct expenditure, a potential secondary layer of premium could arise if hybrid activity escalates or becomes more geographically widespread. Prolonged instability might influence access to financing, increase the cost of capital, or prompt selective capital reallocation away from frontier regions. However, this dynamic is not yet observable at scale; current financial flows remain stable, though a worsening of hybrid pressure could begin to shape investment decisions more visibly over time.

Do Hybrid Threats Accelerate the Shift Away from Vulnerable Regions?

To further elaborate on the idea of whether organizations are moving business away from affected regions, from what we have observed hybrid activity rarely triggers immediate withdrawal; instead, it often drives gradual rebalancing. Companies are reinforcing supply chains, spreading risk across multiple corridors, and investing in continuity tools rather than relocating outright. The aim is to preserve operational stability while navigating a tense regional landscape.

The indirect nature of hybrid warfare means companies are likely to respond differently compared to the outbreak of conventional conflict, with the potential of a rapid deterioration of the operating environment. For example, at the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war, many foreign firms were caught off guard and forced to suspend operations immediately. By contrast, the impact of hybrid warfare tends to disrupt and reshape commercial operations rather than bring them to a halt. The high costs and uncertainty associated with relocating entire operations make abrupt withdrawal less likely.

Instead, companies are likely to focus on greater investment in alternative supply chains, multi-sourcing, secondary data centers, cyber-secure logistics systems, and alternative rail or maritime corridors to minimize disruption. These measures do carry additional financial implications, as maintaining extra inventory or using alternative transport routes to mitigate hybrid threats can be expensive. Nevertheless, such strategic calculations are becoming more prominent as Europe’s geopolitical environment grows more tense.

Strengthening Supply Chain Resilience and Risk-Sharing With Logistics Partners

In this constantly shifting, murkily imperiled landscape, company resilience to hybrid threats is increasingly measured through visibility, flexibility, and cooperation. Manufacturers are mapping supplier dependencies, strengthening redundancy in logistics routes, and expanding data-sharing with partners. These steps build the capacity to respond quickly when hybrid incidents interrupt normal operations.

Diversifying Suppliers and Enhancing Resilience. Across Europe, manufacturers are increasingly engaged in mapping out their supply chains to understand where key vulnerabilities lie, whether due to geography, concentration of suppliers, or exposure to politically sensitive markets. This includes identifying dependencies located near conflict zones or vital infrastructure that might be disrupted by hybrid-style incidents.

Broader awareness has prompted some manufacturers to maintain parallel supplier networks, enabling faster substitution when a key vendor or corridor becomes unreachable. In some sectors, such as semiconductors, automotive parts, and chemicals, companies have also adopted more flexible contractual arrangements, allowing for price or delivery renegotiation in the event of sustained geopolitical instability.

Another pattern is the incremental buildup of safety stock for critical components. Firms are quietly distributing essential materials across multiple facilities or third‑party warehouses to buffer against short‑term interruptions. These adjustments reflect a trade‑off between operational resilience and financial efficiency: rising storage and obsolescence costs have to be weighed against the insurance value of maintaining production continuity under stress.

Diversifying Logistics Routes. The logistics dimension has seen a comparable shift. Reliance on any single transit corridor—whether a particular rail line, port, or pipeline—has increasingly been viewed as a structural weakness. Some companies have responded by dispersing transportation pathways and contracting multiple carriers across regions with differing levels of geopolitical exposure.

Technological integration is increasingly becoming a key feature of this new resilience. Deployments of AI‑enabled inventory and shipment‑tracking systems have improved transparency along extended supply chains, offering real‑time insight when shipments are delayed or rerouted because of cyber interruptions, port congestion, or airspace restrictions. The greater focus on traceability has also improved coordination between firms and their logistics providers, making it easier to identify early signs of disruption before cascading supply chain effects occur.

Scenario exercises, simulation drills that model temporary loss of access to a key supplier, corridor, or region, are now a regular practice in several manufacturing sectors. These exercises serve less as predictive forecasters than as stress tests: they expose where emergency protocols might break down and which substitute routes or suppliers are realistically usable.

Another notable trend involves expanded information‑sharing between manufacturers, freight operators, and national logistics agencies. Rather than operating in isolation, companies can participate in local or sector‑wide working groups that track transport vulnerabilities, monitor regional cyber incidents, or coordinate response mechanisms.

Conclusion

Hybrid warfare has made resilience a continuous process rather than a contingency plan for organizations with business in affected zones. The most durable companies will not be those least exposed to geopolitical risk, but those most capable of adapting to it. Managing uncertainty now depends on sustained collaboration across suppliers, logistics networks, and governments. Resilience strategy in these circumstances means consistent investment in awareness and coordination strategies, while learning to operate steadily amid uncertainty that is unlikely to fade.

About the Author:
Richard Gardiner is a Senior Analyst on the Strategic Intelligence team of cybersecurity and corporate intelligence firm S-RM.

Subscribe to Industry Today